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1 INTRODUCTION 
Seminal bills of rights invariably emanate from periods of struggle and 
represent a collective commitment to ensure that the conditions which led 
to the conflict from which the society in question is emerging, are not 
allowed to develop again in the future. As such, these bills of rights by 
nature have a retroactive element. The South African Bill of Rights is a case 
in point. 
The effect of the past could for example be seen in the South African Bill 
of Rights in the emphasis on substantive equality, the role assigned to 
dignity, the limitations on freedom of expression and the uniquely impor-
tant position which socio-economic rights occupy in this document. The 
new South African Constitution' provides arguably the most sophisticated 
and comprehensive system for the protection of socio-economic rights of 
all the constitutions in the world today. This could be traced back in no 
small measure to the fact that one of the most hideous features of apartheid 
was the systematic violation of the norms of social and economic justice. 
2 THE INITIAL DEBATE AND ITS CONCLUSION 
Although there was a large measure of agreement on the eventual approach 
taken in respect of socio-economic rights in the new Constitution, there 
had been much disagreement on how to deal with this issue along the 
way. One side argued for and the other side campaigned against granting 
a significant role for sO,cio-economic rights in the Constitution, with a range 
of options in between." 
I Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Act 108 of 1996. 
2 See Rycroft 1988; Mureinik 1992; Davis 1992; Scott 1992; De Villiers 1992; De Villiers 












































2.1 The debate 
The most persuasive parts of the arguments at both extremes centred 
around the effect which the inclusion of socio-economic rights could have 
on the legitimacy of the Constitution. Those who argued in favour of a 
significant role for these rights pointed out that it makes little sense to tell 
people that their civil and political rights will be protected, if they continue 
to be at the mercy of the elements and of social exploitation. Freedom of 
expression means little to someone who is dying of hunger. If socio-eco-
nomic rights were not given meaningful protection by the Constitution, it 
was said, the legitimacy of the Constitution would suffer because people 
would be bound to say it does not deal with their most fundamental 
needs. This raised the spectre of angry and disillusioned people holding up 
the Constitution and asking whether this is what the struggle was all about. 
The argument on the other side was thac it would be equally erosive to 
the legitimacy of the Constitution if it promised too much. Rights impose 
corresponding duties, and the Constitution would lose its credibility if it 
told people they have rights in respect of which the state cannot deliver, 
due to a lack of resources. If socio-economic rights were to be portrayed 
in the Bill of Rights ultimately as rights which do not differ in any way 
from other rights, the entire Bill of Rights would be discredited when it 
becomes apparent that the country cannot meet the expectations the 
Constitution had created. Civil and political rights would go down together 
with socio-economic rights. The haunting picture of people saying the 
struggle has been betrayed reappeared. 
A related issue was the question about the role of judges in this regard. 
Justice Albie Sachs would later, in a different context, refer to the danger 
of "dikastocracy", or rule by judges.~ As independent agents judges are not 
accountable to anyone, not even to the electorate as a whole. They do not 
and should not represent the people in any direct way. It consequently 
becomes a question. in a system based on the principle that "the people 
shall govern", how much power judges should be given in respect of 
budgetary issues, as would invariably be the case when socio-economic 
rights are justiciable in the same way as other rights. Should Parliament -
the body representing the people - not have ultimate control over the 
budget? On the other hand, were judges going to be left in a position 
where they could adjudicate on what some would consider to be legal 
niceties, but have no power to deal with real issues of justice and injustice? 
The different options that were available to solve this quandary included 
(1) the full recognition of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights with-
out any special qualifications; (2) including socio-economic rights in the 
Bill of Rights as justiciable rights, but subjecting them to special qualifica-
tions (several options were mooted); (3) merely listing them as non-
justiciable principles of state policy; or (4) not making any reference to 
these rights at all. 










































I INTRODUCTION TO SOCIO-ECONOMICNGHTSIN THES6~TIi AFRICAN CONSTITUTION I 
2.2 The conclusion 
The interim Constitution, which was in force from 1994 to 1997, followed 
what has been called a ,"minimalist" approach: Since the negotiations 
where this Constitution was drafted, were aimed merely at facilitating the 
transition to democracy when a fully representative Constitutional As-
sembly would draft a new Constitution, the approach followed in respect 
of the Bill of Rights in the interim Constitution was to include only the 
largely uncontroversial rights contained in most other democratic consti-
tutions, In practice these were almost exclusively civil and political rights 
and as a consequence only a very limited list of socio-economic rights 
were included: section 32(a) guaranteed the right of everyone to basic 
education; section 30(1 )(c) guaranteed the right of every child to security, 
basic nutrition and basic health and social services; section 25(1 )(b) guar-
anteed the right of detained persons to be detained under conditions 
consonant with human dignity, which include the provision of adequate 
nutrition, reading material and medical treatment at state expense; and 
section 27 enshrined various labour related rights, including the rights of 
workers to fair labour practices. to form and join trade unions and to 
strike, The question of the possible inclusion of socio-economic rights in 
the "final" Constitution was left for the Constitutional Assembly to resolve, 
Against this background, the following balance was struck by the Consti-
tutional Assembly in respect of socio-economic rights in the final Constitu-
tion: With regard to the question whether these rights should be recog-
nised as human rights - we may call it "norm setting" - it was agreed that 
socio-economic rights would be recognised in the Bill of Rights as such, as 
rights on the same level as civil and political rights. However, while some 
of these rights or aspects of these rights would not be subjected to special 
qualifications, it was decided that extensive internal Ilmitations would 
apply in respect of most aspects of these rights, to restrict the obligations 
placed on the state. 
As far as the enforcement of these rights is concerned - we may call it 
"norm enforcement" - two institutions would be given explicit roles: the 
courts and South African Human Rights Commission. The rights as defined 
- that is, given their internal limitations, where applicable - would in the 
first place be justiciable, and would consequently be subject to the "hard 
protection" offered by the binding decisions which courts can take.s As 
will be indicated, the justiciability of these rights means that they can be 
invoked both directly and indirectly by litigants. In the second place, the 
South African Human Rights Commission would be given a special man-
date to monitor the realisation of these rights. Since the Commission's 
4 See Du Plessis and Corder 1994; 45. 
5 For the observations of the Constitutional COUrt on the justiciability of socie-economic 
rights. see Ex parte Chairperson oj the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification oj the 
Constitution oj the Republic oJ South Africa. 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC); 1996 10 BCLR 
1253 (CC) paras 77 and 78. For the first decision of the Constitutional Court dealing 
with a socio-economic right protected in the final Constitution, see Soobramoney v 










































decisions are not legally binding. this could be referred to as a mechanism 
for the "soft protection" of socio-economic rights, emphasising the pro-
grammatic involvement of all sectors in government in the implementa-
tion of socio-economic rights. 
The role played by the two institutions mentioned above should of course 
be seen in the context of and in interaction with the role of those institu-
tions with an implicit, but vital function in the process of implementing 
socio-economic rights, such as the legislature, elected by popular franchise. 
3 SOURCES OF LAW 
The inclusion of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights in a national 
constitution is a relatively recent development. and the scale on which this 
was done in the South African Constitution is certainly unique. While 
some gUidance could be obtained from the experience in other countries,6 
there is a particularly strong need to obtain guidance from the jurispru-
dence which has been developed on the level of international law. The 
legal protection of socio-economic rights. after all, largely has its roots in 
international law. 
The primary United Nations human rights instrument dealing with so-
cio-economic rights is the International Covenant on Economic. Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966. to which South Africa is in the process of 
becoming a state party.7 Other international instruments with strong 
socio-economic rights dimensions are the Universal Declaration on Hu-
man Rights (1948),8 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (1979)q and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (1989).'0 South Africa is a state party to the latter two conven-
tions. 
The applicable regional instrument. from the South African point of 
view, is the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. to which 
South Africa is a state party. The African Charter contains both civil and 
political and socio-economic rights. which. when the African Court on 
Human Rights is operational. will in principle be justiciable." Other re-
gional instruments that deal with economic and social rights are the 
European Social Charter (1961) and the Additional Protocol to the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights ("Protocol of San Salvador") (1988) which is not yet in force. 
The international body tasked with the supervision of compliance with 
the ICESCR by state parties is the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights ("the Committee"). As is the case with most treaty monitor-
ing bodies which deal with socio-economic rights, they receive regular 
6 See e g De Vos 1997. 
7 See Liebenberg 1995. 
8 A 22·26. 
9 A 3 and 10·14. 
lOA 4. 6(2). 19.20.24. 26-29.3!. 










































reports from states parties on the realisation of these rights in the respec-
tive countries. The reports are submitted by the governments in question, 
but the practice has developed that NGOs also submit alternative or 
"shadow" reports, which are then considered alongside those of the states 
when performance of the state in question is evaluated. 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has issued a 
number of General Comments on the ICESCR, which are highly influential 
in the interpretation of socio-economic rights in general. On a more 
informal level bodies of experts have also formulated similar guidelines, 
the most important being the Limburg Principles on the Implementation oj 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1986, 
the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations oj Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights of 1997 and the Bangalore Declaration and Plan oj Action of 1995.'2 
4 NORM SETTING AND NORM ENFORCEMENT 
In what follows the most important provisions of the South African Consti-
tution which deal with socio-economic rights will be discussed, with refer-
ence to the international documents discussed above where necessary. 
4.1 Norm setting 
The Preamble to the Constitution starts by recognising the injustices of the 
past, and then sets out national objectives, including the goal of establishing 
"a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights". Thereafter a wide range of socio-economic rights are recog-
nised alongSide civil and political rights as human rights in the Bill of Rights. 
The very structure of the Bill of Rights is designed to emphasise the fact 
that socio-economic rights in the South African Bill of Rights are part and 
parcel of the wider concept of human rights. Socio-economic rights are not 
listed separately under their own heading or even grouped together - they 
are interspersed between the other rights, on an equal level, emphasising 
the interdependence and indivisibility of the different generations of rights. 
4.1.1 General provisions 
A number of general provisions in the Bill of Rights apply to all the rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights, including the socio-economic rights, and 
are crucially important when the status and scope of these rights are 
considered. Before the specific rights are considered, these general provi-
sions will now be considered. 
The most important general provision which describes the duties im-
posed on the state by the rights contained in the Bill of Rights - including 
the socio-economic rights - is section 7(2), which provides that "[t]he state 
must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights". 
Exactly what these terms mean is not defined in the Constitution, but the 
jurisprudence developed on the international level does provide some 
gUidelines. 










































• LAW.DEMOCRAtv 0< DEVELOPM~NT .. 
Applied in the context of socio-economic rights. the obligation to respect 
means that the state itself has a negative duty not to interfere with the 
existing enjoyment of these rights. An example of a violation of this duty 
would be where the state. without proper justification or procedure, 
demolishes the shacks of squatters. thereby removing their existing access 
to housing. The duty to protect places a positive duty on the state to pro-
tect the bearers of these rights from unwarranted interference by private 
or non-state parties, or at least to provide an effective remedy should that 
have happened. Applied to the right to access to sufficient food for in-
stance, this duty implies that the state is under an obligation to regulate 
the prices of basic foodstuffs, in order to ensure that they remain within 
the reach of ordinary people. The obligation to promote imposes a positive 
duty on the state to ensure that people are aware of their rights. The 
obligation to fulfil refers to the pOSitive obligation on the state to ensure 
the full realisation of the rights in question. Applied to socio-economic 
rights. the duty to fulfil means that, except to the extent that this is ex-
cluded through internal qualifiers (and of course the general limitations 
clause), the state must ensure that everyone within its jurisdiction ulti-
mately receives the social goods in question. lJ 
The second general provision which has a potential impact on socio-
economic rights that should be mentioned here is section 8(2), which 
provides as follows: 
"A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if. and to 
the extent that. it is applicable. taking into account the nature of the right and 
the nature of any duty imposed by the right." 
The implications are that in appropriate cases socio-economic rights do 
not only bind the state. and consequently apply to the "vertical" relation-
ship between individuals and the state, but could also apply "horizontally", 
in respect of the relationship between private entities. This is a controver-
sial issue and its full implications have not yet been resolved. As will be 
pointed out, the provision on arbitrary evictions" clearly binds private 
persons, and it is submitted that the provision that no one shall be denied 
emergency medical treatmentl5 will also bind private parties. 
It should also be pointed out that all socio-economic rights - like other 
rights in the Bill of Rights - in addition to internal qualifiers where appli-
cable, are subject to the general limitation clause contained in section 36. 
4.1.2. Specific rights 
When we turn from general provisions to the actual way in which the 
socio-economic rights are formulated in the Bill of Rights, it becomes clear 
that two categories of rights can be identified. As was indicated above, 
there are those with a fairly standard list of internal qualifications, and 
those without these qualifications. The standard qualifications referred to 
13 See the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights para 6. 
14 S 26(3). 










































II!'lTROOiJCnONiOsbtlQ-ECONQMICBIGHTS INTHE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION I 
typically provide that only "access" to the social good in question needs to 
be provided; that this is to be done "subject to available resources", and 
that only "reasonable legislative and other measures" are to be taken 
towards the "progressive realisation" of these rights. Because these inter-
nal qualifications in the South African Constitution are similar in formula-
tion to qualifications attached to economic and social rights in the ICESCR, 
some guidance on the meaning of these terms may be obtained through 
reference to the international jurisprudence referred to above. The formu-
lation of some socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution as 
rights to "access" to certain social goods, rather than as direct rights to the 
social goods in question, does not reflect the formulation of socio-economic 
rights in the ICESCR or other international instruments, where rights are 
formulated as direct rights. This formulation does, however, give expres-
sion to the interpretation attached to the rights on the international level 
as in the first instance rights to the creation of an enabling environment 
rather than rights to the provision of specific social goods. 
The point of departure on the international level with regard to socio-
economic rights is that of individuals who, given the right kind of enabling 
environment, are able to acquire the social goods implied by these rights 
for themselves. lb The initial obligation of states in terms of the rights is 
therefore to create the right kind of environment within which self-sufficient 
individuals are able to acquire social goods for themselves and not to pro-
vide the social goods directly, except in certain exceptional cases. 
The phrasing of the rights in the South African Constitution as rights "to 
have access to" social goods points towards the application of the above 
understanding of the state's obligations. If one takes the example of the 
right to access to sufficient food,17 this means that the state is not ordinar-
ily required to provide food to the population, but only to ensure that 
enough food of sufficient quality is available at affordable prices, so that 
ordinary people can reasonably access that food. Only where individuals 
or groups of people are objectively unable to acquire food for themselves, 
for example in the case of natural disaster or famine, or other forms of 
destitution. does the state become responsible for the actual provision of 
food. For the rights phrased as "access" rights, there is in other words, at 
least in the first instance, no absolute entitlement to the provision of the 
social goods in questions. free of charge and on demand. 
The phrase "subject to available resources" in the South African Consti-
tution mirrors the phrase "to the maximum of its available resources" 
found in article 2(1) of the ICESCR. The Committee on Economic. Social 
and Cultural Rights has made a number of observations about this qualifi-
cation. It is intended to inject an element of realism into the discourse 
surrounding these rights. ensuring that the state is not required, as a 
matter of absolute obligation. to do more than it has the resources to do. It 
is. however. not a blanket excuse for failure to realise the right in question: 
States parties are required to " ... ensure the widest possible enjoyment of 
16 Craven 1 995: 120-121. 










































the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances,,:8 Even if resources 
are inadequate, the State must be able to show that it uses all the re-
sources at its disposal, to the maximum extent, to satisfy its obligations in 
terms of the rights as a matter of priority. 
The description of the means through which the state is required to real-
ise the qualified socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution 
("reasonable legislative and other measures") are similar to those men-
tioned in article 2(1) of the [CESCR ("all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures"). With regard to this 
qualification, the Committee has indicated that, although legislative meas-
ures are highly desirable and often indispensable, the adoption of such 
measures is by no means exhaustive of the obligations imposed on state 
parties. Many other measures can be appropriate (or in the South African 
context "reasonable"), depending on the circumstances. Examples of meas-
ures other than legislative efforts that may be appropriate ("reasonable") 
are the provision of judicial and other effective remedies for violations of 
the rights, and administrative, finanCial, educational and social measures, 19 
The last standard internal qualifier. the reqUirement that the state is 
only obliged to achieve the "progressive realisation" of the rights in ques-
tion, is also mirrored in article 2(1) of the [CESCR by the requirement that 
states parties must "take steps ... with a view to achieving progreSSively the 
full realisation of the rights recognized". Because the full realisation of socio-
economic rights (building hospitals and universities, training doctors. et 
cetera) takes time, an obligation to realise the rights fully immediately would 
be unrealistic - the obligation is accordingly tempered to require only the 
full realisation of the rights over time, Again this is not a blanket reprieve, 
allowing the state to postpone fulfilling its obligations indefinitely. The 
state must "move as expeditiously and effectively as possible" toward the 
full realisation of the rights. 20 The state must take at least some steps 
toward the realisation of the rights in question immediately, with others to 
follow as soon as objectively possible. The state must also be able to show 
that measurable progress towards the realisation of the rights is being 
made. Any retrogreSSive measures. limiting or removing existing entitle-
ments. would reqUire special justification. 21 
The Committee has also pointed out that, even though the full realisa-
tion of the rights can occur over time, certain minimum essential levels of 
realisation have to be provided immediately (the so-called "minimum core 
content" of the rights). If a significant number of individuals within a state 
is deprived of. for instance, essential basic foodstuffs, or essential primary 
health care, then that state would prima facie be in violation of the rights 
to food and health care, even though generally it only has to realise these 
rights progressively.22 
18 General Comment No 3 {I 990) para II. 
19 General Comment No 3 (1990) paras 4. 5 and 7, 
20 General Comment No 3 (1990) para 9. 
21 See the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations oJ Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. para 8, 










































I INTRODUCTION TO socto-EcONOMIe RtGHTS IN THE SOUTH AF'RleA~ eONSrrTUnON I 
Where socio-economic rights in the Constitution are not subject to the 
internal qualifications discussed above, the obligation on the state is much 
more immediate, and could be compared to the duties imposed by most 
civil and political rights, including duties to directly provide certain benefits. 
Based on the difference between provisions that do include these quali-
fications, and those that do not, the different kinds of obligations placed 
on the state can consequently be distinguished. Where the internal qualifi-
cations do not apply, one is dealing with what could be described for the 
sake of convenience as "priority obligations"; those rights in respect of 
which they do apply could be described as "internally qualified rights". 
"Priority obligations" are created by a number of provisions. First, sec-
tion 28(1 )(c) provides that every child has the right "to basic nutrition, 
shelter, basic health care services, and social services". 
Second, section 29(1 )(b) provides that everyone has the right "to a basic 
education, including adult basic education". In In re The School Education 
Bill of 1995 (Gauteng/3 the Constitutional Court, dealing with the right to 
basic education enshrined in section 32(a) of the interim Constitution, 
held that this right imposes positive obligations on the State to provide 
education of a certain standard to every person, and not merely a nega-
tive obligation allowing a person to pursue his or her own education.24 In 
Motala and Another v University of Natal<5 the then Supreme Court dis-
cussed the meaning of the term "basic education" as used in section 32(a) 
of the interim Constitution and held that basic education does not include 
education at tertiary institutions, or other forms of higher education. 
Third, section 35(2)(e) provides that every detainee, including every 
sentenced prisoner, has the right 
"to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at 
least exercise and the provision, at state expense. of adequate accommoda-
tion, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment". 
The implications of this section, in so far as it relates to adequate medical 
treatment, have been interpreted in B and Others v Minister of Correctional 
Services and Others.26 In this case HIV positive prisoners claimed that they 
had a right to receive certain anti-viral medication at state expense. Such 
medication was provided to non-paying patients at provincial hospitals 
outside prison only under very limited circumstances. Internationally 
accepted medical practice, however, considered anti-viral therapy to be 
necessary in such cases. 
The Court held that the question as to what constitutes "adequate" 
medical treatment of prisoners should not be established with exclusive 
reference to what is being prescribed outside of prison - prisoners 
might be entitled to a higher level of care. This does not mean that they 
are entitled to optimal medical care, irrespective of costs. since bUdgetary 
23 19964 BeLR 537 (ee). 
24 Para 9 per Mohamed J. 
25 19953 BeLR 374 (D). 
26 1997 6 BeLR 789 (el (also cited as Van Biljon and Others v Minister Of Correctional 











































constraints do playa role in determining what is to be considered "ade-
quate". However, because the Department had not proved that it did not 
have the necessary funds to provide the anti-viral treatment, the applica-
tion was granted. 
It could also be said that sections 26(3) and 27(3) create priority obliga-
tions. Section 26(3) provides that 
"[n]o one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, 
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circum-
stances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions». 
In Despatch Municipality v Sunridge Estate and Development Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd,27 the High Court held that section 38 of the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act 52 of 1951, which permitted the summary demolition of 
unauthorised buildings or structures, without a court order, was in conflict 
with section 26(3) and accordingly invalid. 
Section 27(3) guarantees that "[n)o one may be refused emergency 
medical treatment". This provision was considered in the case of Soobra-
money v Minister oj Health, KwaZulu-Natal,28 which concerned an applica-
tion for kidney dialysis at state expense by an unemployed person. In 
turning down the application, the Court said that the treatment of chronic 
diseases was not covered. 29 The section merely provided that "a person 
who suffers a sudden catastrophe which calls for immediate medical atten-
tion should not be refused ambulance or other emergency services which 
are available and should not be turned away from a hospital which is able 
to provide the necessary treatment".30 
"Internally qualified rights" are created by the following provisions: 
First. section 26 which reads: 
"( 1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing, 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources. to achieve the progressive realisation of this right." 
Second. section 27 which reads: 
"(1) Everyone has the right to have access to -
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
(b) sufficient food and water; and 
(cl social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves 
and their dependants. appropriate social assistance. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its avail-
able resources. to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights." 
Section 27(l)(a) and section 27(2) (as it relates to section 27(1)(a». re-
ceived the attention of the Constitutional Court in the Soobramoney case 
referred to above, The applicant in this case claimed the provision of kid-
ney dialysis treatment from a provincial state hospital, based on his right 
27 1997 8 BeLR 1023 (SE). 
28 1998 I SA 765 (ee), 
29 Para 21. 










































iINJ;Rot$OCflON TO SOClo.:ECONOMICRIGHTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITlJTION.1 
to emergency medical treatment" and his right to life.32 on a substantive 
reading. The Court dismissed the claim based on these two rights, but 
then went further to discuss the possibilities of success of the claim had it 
been brought on the basis of the section 27(1 )(a) right to access to health 
care services. The Court stated that section 27(1 )(a) was qualified by 
section 27(2), which. inter alia, determines that the state is only required 
to give effect to the section 27(1 )(a) right "within its available resources". 
The Court then found that the respondent had shown that it had limited 
resources available for the provision of kidney dialysis treatment (this was 
not only true about the particular hospital involved. but applied nationally) 
which did not allow it to provide the treatment to all who required it. The 
respondent had further shown that it had developed a set of reasonable 
and fair criteria according to which to decide who would receive the 
limited treatment available and who would not and that those criteria had 
been applied in good faith in the instant case. Stating that courts would be 
"slow to interfere With rational decisions taken in good faith by the politi-
cal organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with 
such matters", the Court found that the claim would also have failed. had 
it been brought on the basis of section 27(1 )(a). 
Finally. section 29(1 )(b) provides that everyone has the right "to further 
education. which the state, through reasonable measures, must make 
progressively available and accessible" 
A set of rights that are enshrined in the Bill of Rights. and that can be 
classified as socio-economic rights. but which do not fit easily into the scheme 
of "priority" rights and "internally qualified" rights set out above. are the rights 
concerning labour relations found in section 23 of the Bill of Rights. These are: 
• the right of everyone to fair labour practices; 
• the rights of workers to form and join, and to participate in the activi-
ties and programmes of a trade union and to strike; 
• the rights of every employer to form and join. and to participate in the 
activities and programmes of an employers' organisation and to en-
gage in collective bargaining; and 
• the rights of trade unions and employers' organisations to determine 
their own administration. programmes and activities, to organise, form 
and join a federation. and to engage in collective bargaining. 
As was pointed out above, all socio-economic rights. the "priority" rights. 
the "internally qualified" rights. as well as the labour rights. are subject to 
the general limitations clause. 
4.2 Norm enforcement 
Two distinctive kinds of norm enforcement mechanisms could play a 
role. As was stated above. they are the "hard" enforcement mechanism of 
the courts. and the "soft" mechanism of the South African Human Rights 
Commission. 
31 S 27(3). 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVE;i..OPMENT I 
4.2.1 Judicial enforcement 
The "hard" or legally binding enforcement mechanism of the courts could 
playa role in two different ways. The first is through the direct justiciabil-
ity of socio-economic rights, that is, an application could be based directly 
on one of the rights in question. An example involving a priority obligation 
would be where the state fails to provide basic education to those who 
cannot afford it; an example involving internally qualified rights could be 
the closing of a rural clinic. when those who used to be treated there are 
left with no other alternatives. 
In the few cases decided on socio-economic rights so far in South Afri-
can, courts have shown themselves, with regard to priority rights, to be 
willing to enforce positive obligations, with direct and substantial mone-
tary implications, against the state.}} 
The only reported case in which one of the qualified rights came under 
discussion was the Soobramoney case referred to above. In this case the 
Constitutional Court, on its own initiative, discussed the possibilities of 
success of a claim for the provision of kidney dialysis treatment by the 
state, if it had been brought on the basis of the section 27(1 ) (a) right to 
access to health care services. 
The Court pointed out that the obligations imposed by section 27(l)(a) 
were directly qualified by section 27(2). As a consequence the Court applied 
a form of substantive administrative review to the decision of the particu-
lar provincial hospital not to provide Mr Soobramoney with kidney dialysis 
treatment. It found that the hospital had clearly and convincingly demon-
strated that its resources only allowed it to provide dialysis treatment to a 
limited number of patients. The decision of which patients would get the 
benefit of the treatment and which would not was taken according to a set 
of rational and objectively fair criteria, which had been applied fairly in the 
particular case. The Court accordingly decided not to overturn the decision 
of the hospital. 
The Soobramoney decision provides some clues as to the Constitutional 
Court's approach to the implications of the qualified socia-economic rights. 
In the first place the Court made it clear that the qualifications imposed on 
a qualified right such as the section 27(1)(a) right to access to health care 
have the implication that decisions related to the implementation of these 
rights are in the first place the province of political organs and service 
providers and not of the courts. The Courts will review the decisions of 
these organs in the light of the rights protected in the Bill of Rights. but in 
doing so would show deference to their discretion. 
The Court further emphasised that, in the application of the qualified 
socio-economic rights, the issue would often be one of equitable distribu-
tion of limited resources. In this context the rights of individuals to the 
provision of particular benefits would have to be balanced against the 
needs of the broader community. 
33 See the B-case referred to above, where the Department of Correctional Services was 
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Secondly, and importantly, courts could enforce socio-economic rights 
indirectly, by allowing these rights to exercise some kind of weight in the 
process whereby the scope and reach of other rights are determined. The 
fact that socio-economic rights are included is bound to exercise a signifi-
cant role in the process of interpreting and limiting civil and political 
rights. The recognition of socio-economic rights in the Constitution, and 
the duties which this places on the state, could, for example, bring a court 
to the conclusion that the protection provided by certain civil and political 
rights is more limited than would have been the case if socio-economic 
rights were not recognised in the Bill of Rights. An example would be 
where the state requires students in certain disciplines, such as health, to 
perform community service. Civil and political rights such as equality, free-
dom of movement and the right against forced labour may be infringed by 
such a practice, but where the state is now under a constitutional duty to 
realise socio-economic rights, such as health rights, it would be much easier 
for the state to justify such requirements. l4 
4.2.2 South African Human Rights Commission 
In contrast with the courts, decisions of the South African Human Rights 
Commission are not legally binding, and could consequently be called a 
"soft" enforcement mechanism. It nevertheless has the potential to playa 
significant role. The South African Human Rights Commission has a 
monitoring role in respect of all human rights, but it has a special role to 
playas far as six sets of socio-economic rights, and the rights concerning 
the environment in the Bill of Rights, are concerned. This mandate is 
created by section 184(3) of the Constitution, which provides as follows: 
"Each year, the Human Rights Commission must require relevant organs of 
state to provide the Commission with information on the measures that they 
have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning 
housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the environment." 
The closest analogy to this unique provision in the South African Constitu-
tion is the international reporting procedures created by conventions such 
as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966). As has been indicated above, in terms of these conventions state 
parties have to submit reports on a regular basis to international treaty 
monitoring bodies, who then have to assess their performance in comply-
ing with the norms articulated in the Convention. 
It has been said that the objective with these international reporting 
procedures are inspection and introspection. The performance of the state 
party in question is assessed from the outSide, but in the process the state 
itself is also compelled to look at what it has achieved in respect of socio-
economic rights in a critical way. The underlying idea is that an obligation 
of justification is placed on the state in this respect. 
The domestic reporting procedure created by section 1 84(3) is largely 
moulded on the international model, and it has potentially the same 
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objectives, but is unique in the sense that it operates on the domestic 
level. Should international practice be followed by the South African 
Human Rights Commission, NGOs will have the opportunity to submit 
their own reports to the Human Rights Commission on the rights in ques-
tion, which will then be considered alongside those submitted by state 
organs. Based on inputs from both sides the Human Rights Commission 
will then be in a position to prepare an independent and objective evalua-
tion, which is then presented to Parliament. This process ideally leads to 
"constructive dialogue" between organs of state, the Human Rigths Com-
mission, Parliament and the public. Ultimately the only sanction is public 
shame - enforcement through embarrassment as on the international level. 
The constitutional protection granted to socio-economic rights in the 
South African Constitution as described above is truly unique. Only a num-
ber of constitutions recognise socio-economic rights as human rights; very 
few made them justiciable at all; none give the courts potentially as large a 
role as is the case in South Africa, and no national system has a domestic 
reporting procedure on socio-economic rights. 
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